A Window of Opportunity for GMO Regulation: Achieving Food Integrity Through Cap-and-Trade Models from Climate Policy for GMO Regulation by Steier, Gabriela
Pace Environmental Law Review 
Volume 34 
Issue 2 Spring 2017 Article 2 
April 2017 
A Window of Opportunity for GMO Regulation: Achieving Food 
Integrity Through Cap-and-Trade Models from Climate Policy for 
GMO Regulation 
Gabriela Steier 
Food Law International LLP, G.Steier@foodlawinternational.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr 
 Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, 
and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gabriela Steier, A Window of Opportunity for GMO Regulation: Achieving Food Integrity Through 
Cap-and-Trade Models from Climate Policy for GMO Regulation, 34 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 293 
(2017) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
  
 
293 
ARTICLE 
 
A Window of Opportunity for GMO 
Regulation: Achieving Food Integrity 
Through Cap-and-Trade Models from  
Climate Policy for GMO Regulation 
 
GABRIELA STEIER, ESQ.* 
 
Apathy can be overcome by enthusiasm, and enthusiasm can 
only be aroused by two things: first, an ideal, which takes the 
imagination by storm, and second, a definite intelligible plan for 
carrying that ideal into practice. 
- Arnold J. Toynbee 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
American-patented commodity crops have taken the European 
market by storm. With an increase of GMO imports, genetically 
engineered (GE) corn, rice, wheat, and soy have flooded the 
European Union (EU). GMOs are difficult to detect once introduced 
into ecosystems,1 and they become inextricably intertwined with 
local biodiversity. In deliberations about approving GE crops, 
policy makers chose to ban GMOs in order to protect the European 
 
1. Reliable, Standardised, Specific, Quantitative Detection of Genetically 
Modified Food, in A DECADE OF EU-FUNDED GMO RESEARCH (2001-2010), at 150 
(2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20130805192627/http://ec.europa.eu/research 
/biosociety/pdf/a_decade_of_eu-funded_gmo_research.pdf [https://perma.cc/5954-
V2AB].  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2
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food system and its ecosystem until GMOs are proven safe.2 
European experts have given equal weight to the food safety and 
environmental impact of genetically engineered organisms 
(GMOs),3 urging legislators to take sustainability, benefits, and 
impact on society into account. This balance of priorities is a clash 
between the prolific commercialization of GMOs and the free trade 
position of the US, and the precautionary and protectionist 
approach of the EU and its member states, wary of the risks that 
GMOs bring along. However, international trade pressures the EU 
to open its gates to even more GMO imports and possibly to 
cultivation of GE crops.4 How could the EU fight back? 
Changing US law on GMO approvals along with the 
confounding and shared regulation of the executive branch’s 
agencies is beyond realistic, permitting uncountable GMOs to be 
farmed and exported to the EU. However, a cap-and-trade model 
borrowed from climate change policy may help the EU to protect 
its member states from GMOs and the associated food safety and 
environmental risks by slightly altering trade. Essentially, if you 
can alter the trade, you can alter the practice,5 as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has shown.6 The reverse is also true and 
evident from the proliferation of GMOs in commodity crop 
agriculture, representing the practice, altered by the potential to 
export and, thereby, trade GMOs widely.7 The goal of this paper is 
to explore and contextualize potential regulatory mechanisms 
 
2. Transboundary Movements, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/ 
gmo/transboundary_en [https://perma.cc/XJR8-2JMG] (“Regulation (EC) 1946/ 
2003 regulates transboundary movements of GMOs and transposes the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety into EU law.”). 
3. European Network on Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Food 
Crops, in A DECADE OF EU-FUNDED GMO RESEARCH (2001-2010), supra note 1, at 
142, 148.  
4. Gabriela Steier, Trivialization Through Proliferation: Genetically 
Engineered Food, Urban Agriculture, and Climate Change Mitigation for 
Improved Food Security in EU-US Trade (forthcoming). 
5. The author thanks Professor Pamela Vesilind for extracting this essential 
insight and for her support and guidance with this paper. 
6. Steier, supra note 4; see also What is the Role of the Multilateral Trading 
System on World Food Prices?, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2009), https://www.wto.org/ 
english/forums_e/debates_e/debate18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/RFF7-9DZG]. 
7. Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered 
-crops-in-the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/X73L-SY83] (last 
updated Nov. 3, 2016).  
3
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borrowed from climate change policy to examine conceivable 
regulatory controls of the spread of Genetically Modified (GM) 
crops as a safeguard of environmental integrity and food 
“integrity.”8 Food systems can benefit from borrowing a cap-and-
trade scheme from climate change regulation for a bottom-up 
market-based (as opposed to government top-down) regulation of 
GMOs to make room for crop diversification, thereby triggering a 
positive ripple effect for agro-ecosystems, food safety and security, 
and food policy in the US. 
A. GMOs as Links of a Centralized Food System 
GMOs are the links of our centralized food system, largely 
dependent on international trade. The Agricultural Market 
Information System, a network to which most large food-producing 
countries subscribe, uses the GE commodity crops of corn, wheat, 
soy, and rice as key market indicators,9 providing data to umbrella 
organizations that determine global policy, such as the WTO and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO).10 Moreover, the well-known Cornucopia Institute’s diagram 
based on Michigan State’s Professor Phil Howard’s research 
visualizes that the seeds are ultimately owned by the major plant 
patent holders, Monsanto, DuPont, Bayer, Syngenta, Dow, and 
BASF.11 These multi-national agricultural companies (hereinafter 
BigAg), dominate both markets and agriculture lobbies, thereby 
exerting tremendous pressure on legislators and policy holders to 
eliminate market barriers, maintain trade paths that allow these 
companies to grow bigger, and boost their bottom lines.12 Recently, 
 
8. Food integrity shall be defined as the measure of environmental 
sustainability and climate change resilience, combined with food safety, security, 
and sovereignty for the farm-to-fork production and distribution of any food 
product. 
9. Supply & Demand, AGRIC. MKT. INFO. SYS., http://www.amis-outlook.org/ 
amis-monitoring/supply-demand/overview/en/ [https://perma.cc/AE63-SY2H]. 
10. Food Security, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
agric_e/food_security_e.htm#amis [https://perma.cc/D2QQ-ALUE].  
11. Phil Howard, Seed Industry Structure 1996-2013, CORNUCOPIA INST., 
https://www.cornucopia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/seedindustry.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L2Q9-7T9B]; see infra Figure 1.  
12. Amy Mayer, Why You Should Care About ‘Big Ag’ Companies Getting 
Bigger, CIVIL EATS (Oct. 31, 2016), http://civileats.com/2016/10/31/why-you-should 
-care-about-big-ag-companies-getting-bigger/ [https://perma.cc/6YML-HQKS].  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2
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these companies have come together to form even larger 
conglomerates, creating power distortions that may, as reports 
warn, “trigger structural changes to the foundations of our food 
system and impact all Americans, whether or not they buy seeds, 
fertilizer or herbicides.”13 As such, the consolidation of food 
systems, owned by BigAg and scrutinized by trade-oriented bodies 
such as the WTO, leave barely any room for considerations of food 
safety, consumer protection, environmental integrity, and overall 
food integrity. Here, food integrity shall be coined as a measure of 
environmental sustainability and climate change resilience, 
combined with food safety, security, and sovereignty for the farm-
to-fork production and distribution of any food product. 
The quantity of GMO production and export are key indicators 
that commodity crops have become an economy of scale – a scale 
that goes beyond country borders,14 across jurisdictions,15 above 
and beyond international treaties,16 and past the planet’s capacity, 
depleting its resources and work force.17 As biotechnology has 
drastically changed American agriculture,18 the necessary 
regulations have not kept up. An estimated 70 percent of food sold 
at grocery stores contains GM ingredients.19 Although 88 million 
acres of GM crops are being cultivated in the US, their 
environmental, public health, and economic implications remain 
 
13. Id. 
14. See generally WORLD TRADE ORG., PRICE VOLATILITY IN FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURAL MARKETS: POLICY RESPONSES (2011), https://www.wto.org/english/ 
news_e/news11_e/igo_10jun11_report_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT8E-XSMM].  
15. See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard Act of 2016, Pub. 
L. No. 114-216, § 764, 130 Stat. 834 (2016) (also called the DARK Act); see also 
Michal Addady, President Obama Signed This GMO Labeling Bill, FORTUNE (July 
31, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/31/gmo-labeling-bill/ [https://perma.cc/PVN 
2-YXFP].  
16. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
17. Fredrik Moberg, et al., How to Feed Nine Billion within the Planet’s 
Boundaries: The Need for an Agroecological Approach, SWEDISH INT’L AGRIC. 
NETWORK INITIATIVE (Mar. 2015), http://www.siani.se/sites/clients.codepositive. 
com/files/document/siani_agroecology_brief_march_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/R35V-
4CFU]. 
18. Jason J. Czarnezki & Emily Montgomery, Genetically Modified 
Organisms and the Environment, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 93, 93 (Mary Jane Angelo et al. eds., 2013). 
19. Id. 
5
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uncertain at best.20 Capping the ever-growing trade of GE crops 
might be a viable solution to interrupt the flux of environmentally 
harmful and risky foods along the trade lines of commodity crops. 
This paper proposes such a cap-and-trade model and explores the 
environmental repercussions of the widespread GM crop 
agriculture. The goal of this paper is to explore regulatory 
mechanisms borrowed from climate change policy to examine 
potential regulatory controls of the spread of GM crops as a 
safeguard of environmental integrity.21 
B. GMO Regulation Under a Climate Change Regulatory 
Model 
Food systems can benefit from borrowing a cap-and-trade 
scheme from climate change regulation for a bottom-up market-
based regulation of GMOs to make room for crop diversification to 
promote food integrity. The novelty of this idea lies in the inward-
pointing regulatory approach where international policy may help 
the US catch up with domestic food policy. Although, the 
regulation of GMOs is an issue that many have written about 
before,22 putting GMO regulation under a climate change 
regulatory approach in the context of capping international trade 
of the most traded GMO commodity crops, is a new twist that 
combines both problems into a proactive solution. 
The proposed solution, despite the vast amount of literature 
on point, is non-obvious. In climate change regulation, cap-and-
trade schemes are well-known, but their applicability to agro-
ecosystems, however, has barely been covered in the literature and 
 
20. Id. 
21. Although GM crops are closely related to GM animals in agriculture, GM 
animals are beyond the scope of this paper. 
22. See, e.g., A. Bryan Endres & Lisa Schlessinger, Pollen Drift: Reframing 
the Biotechnology Liability Debate, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 815 (2014); Bernd van 
der Meulen & Neshe Yusuf, One-Door-One-Key Principle: Observations Regarding 
Integration of GM Authorization Procedures in the EU, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 877 
(2014); Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: Why 
Institutional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y. 1 (2008); Cara V. Coburn, Comment, Out of the Petri Dish and Back to the 
People: A Cultural Approach to GMO Policy, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 283 (2005); 
Elizabeth G. Hill, Comment, Nature’s Harvest or Man’s Profit: Environmental 
Shortcuts in the Deregulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
353 (2012).   
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2
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certainly not from a legal point of view. Borrowing climate change 
regulation for food systems is a practical idea because agriculture 
should not be separated (through agricultural exceptionalism as 
explained below) from environmental considerations and, thereby, 
climate change considerations. Thus, agro-ecology is the 
sustainable counterpart to industrial monocultures and GE 
cropping. 
Finally, considering how a cap-and-trade system might apply 
to food systems is a useful start for policy makers and supplies a 
basis for further discourse. This paper takes issues left open—h ow 
GMOs and climate change should be regulated—in legal literature, 
and combines them by zooming in on one particular tangent, 
namely food trade. Correspondingly, food trade regulation could be 
a powerful tool to unleash or disrupt the centralized food system 
by capping commodity crop trade, and thereby discouraging 
unsustainable GE cropping, thus redistributing resources and 
opening trade routes for agro-ecologically produced alternatives to 
commodity crops. This ripple effect may serve to decentralize food 
systems and invigorate local supply chains, which has predictably 
positive environmental outcomes, such as reduced food miles, less 
fossil fuel dependence, improved crop diversity, and even a more 
varied food supply produced at greater transparency to improve 
food safety and security in the best case scenarios.23 
C. Trans-Atlantic Comparison: US-American Free Trade 
and European Precautionary Protectionism 
This paper takes a comparative law approach, borrowing from 
climate change policy on the one hand, and from related legal 
systems, on the other. The functionality principle from modern 
comparative law24 informs the methodology in this paper by 
examining the concrete problem of how GMOs can be regulated in 
international trade. Comparing the EU to the US approaches 
serves to juxtapose two extremes: the free trade (US) and the 
protectionist (EU) approach of GMO trade regulation. 
 
23. See Moberg et al., supra note 17; Gabriela Steier, Small Farmers Cool the 
Planet- The Case for Rights-Based International Agroecological Law, 4(2) 
GRONINGEN J. INT’L. L. 1 (2016). 
24. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEINRICH KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 34-35 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2011). 
7
  
300 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
Additionally, in borrowing the cap-and-trade model from climate 
change policy, this policy proposes mechanisms to close some 
loopholes established through agricultural exceptionalism from a 
food law approach, as explained in Part 3. Resulting from this 
climate change policy extension to agricultural trade, food systems 
may find more sustainable and environmentally friendly 
alternatives that decentralize and open-up trade on a global scale. 
The structure of US law has not yielded a GMO regulatory 
framework as sustainable and environmentally friendly as in the 
EU, despite extensive regulation of the food and agricultural 
sector. States have started to require labeling of GMOs as a 
consumer protection scheme,25 but the BigAg lobby continues to be 
so powerful that additional legislation may be obsolete. Thus, 
assuming that additional GMO regulation on a federal level is a 
solution beyond the scope of this paper, one may envision trying 
the market-based approach, capping the amount of GMOs that can 
be traded. Zooming further in on the GMO market, commodity 
crops compose the primary traded crops26 and, therefore, lend 
themselves to being a test group for such a cap-and trade scheme. 
In 2016-2017, according to USDA-FAS data, the US alone 
dominates world production with 386.7 million metric tonnes of 
corn (nearly 60 percent globally), 474 of milled rice (98.5 percent 
globally), and 688.4 of wheat (about 91.6 percent globally).27 The 
EU imports large quantities of oilseeds, animal feedstuffs, and rice, 
according to the WTO’s tariffs and duty regulations.28 Competing 
with the US, “wheat is by far the most popular cereal grown in the 
EU, making up nearly half the total[,]” with corn and barley each 
making up another third.29 As such, comparing the US and EU 
 
25. For a list of states requiring GMO labeling, see GMO Labeling Isn’t Dead: 
See Which States Are Leading the Fight, JUST LABEL IT!, http://www.justlabelit. 
org/press-center/press-items/gmo-labeling-isnt-dead-see-which-states-are-
leading-the-fight [https://perma.cc/Z53S-5N3Y]. 
26. Jeff Daniels, Agriculture Commodity Traders See a Good 2017, Despite 
Possible Demand Risks, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2017, 4:07 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/ 
2017/01/03/agriculture-commodity-traders-see-a-good-2017-despite-possible-
demand-risks.html [https://perma.cc/5ELC-K93Y]. 
27. Estimated calculation based on FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., All Grain 
Summary Comparison, in GRAIN: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE 3 (2017), https:// 
apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/grain.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT4W-HFVH]. 
28. Cereals, Oilseeds and Protein Crops, Rice, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec. 
europa.eu/agriculture/cereals_en [https://perma.cc/DQ5T-M6VK]. 
29. Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2
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commodity crop trade schemes may be quite revealing as globally 
dominant forces with international impact on the agricultural 
sector. 
From the onset, however, the clashes of the US-American and 
European legal systems must be accounted for from a 
comparativist perspective. Following the negative aspect of the 
functionality principle30 in this comparative analysis, “sources of 
law” are “whatever molds or affects the living law in [the] chosen 
system.”31 Simply put, the author strives to think creatively, 
eradicating the preconception and investigating the positive 
aspects of the European and US-American legal systems compared 
herein, to find an analogy to the solution of interest, i.e. the forced 
diversification of crops to weaken GMO proliferation through US 
exports.32 The premise for this methodology is that of Ernst Rabel, 
an internationally renowned comparativist, finding that “social, 
economic and legal fields interact[]” to shape political and legal 
ideals.33 Here, the ideals point toward more sustainable and 
resilient food production of diversified crops. Underlying this 
approach is a simple premise: for sustainable agricultural systems 
to feed future populations, GMOs must be heavily regulated and 
stopped from flooding the international crop markets. Diversifying 
the crop trade of the major producers and importers, the US and 
the EU respectively, illustrates which legal tools can be targeted 
to achieve these goals. Using cap-and-trade methods from 
greenhouse gas (GHG) trading models in climate change policy 
provides an imaginable upstream regulatory model. Finally, 
choosing a comparison of the EU and the US systems is merely a 
trans-Atlantic geographical limitation to deepen the analysis of the 
US - from where many GMOs originate, on the one hand, and the 
EU - of the most resistant governments to GMOs, on the other 
hand. Then, an explanation of the clash between free trade and 
protectionist perceptions create a basis for the subsequent context 
of international GMO trade, as well as its environmental and food 
safety risks. 
In Part 1, the pertinent risks of genetically engineered crops 
are contrasted to conventionally bred counterparts, clarifying 
 
30. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 24, at 35. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. (citations omitted). 
9
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common misconceptions and highlighting the need for improved 
regulation. Concepts of food policy and macroeconomics, such as 
free trade and protectionism, are briefly introduced by way of 
background information for the following legal analysis. Then, 
Part 2 identifies the problematic risks of GMO under-regulation, 
namely uncontrolled environmental harm and food insecurity. 
Explaining how agricultural exceptionalism enables the US-
American free-trade approach to GMO regulation, prioritizes 
profitability of agriculture over other important considerations, 
such as public health, socio-economic and direct and indirect 
environmental effects. Part 3 proposes a solution, a cap-and-trade 
upstream regulation of GMOs borrowed from climate change 
policy. The applicability to the US is explored in context of paragon 
directives from the EU on GMO regulation. Notably, in conceding 
that the US GMO regulatory policy does not exist in a vacuum, this 
paper takes a comparative law approach, contrasting the US free 
trade against the EU protectionism and precautionary models, 
evaluating both with the goal to extract a cap-and-trade model 
suitable for the US and concludes with an evaluation of the 
proposed model. 
II. SETTING UP THE MODEL: MISCONCEPTIONS 
AND KNOWLEDGE GAPS 
A. Genetically Engineered Versus Conventionally Bred 
Crops 
To clarify common misconceptions from the onset, genetically 
engineered crops do not occur in nature and are inherently 
“unnatural” because they cross species barriers and are designed 
to be mass-produced in industrial agricultural schemes. 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), also known as 
Genetically Engineered (GE) or Genetically Modified (GM) crops 
are widely understood to be modified to give desired traits through 
biotechnology of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA).34 In 
contrast, conventional breeding includes other methods, such as 
selective breeding, crossing, and interspecies hybridization.35 The 
 
34. NEIL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 
277 (Wiley & Sons eds., 2d ed. 2016). 
35. Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2
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relevant difference between genetic engineering and conventional 
breeding for this paper is that GE plants are specifically 
engineered to industrial agriculture, cultivation in monocultures, 
and thereby, highly resource-intensive and environmentally 
harmful practices.36 
There are several types of GE crops, such as, among others, 
herbicide resistant (HT) and insect resistant (Bt) varieties, which 
are abundant in the US.37 According to the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), HT crops have been “developed to survive 
application of specific herbicides that previously would have 
destroyed the crop along with the targeted weeds.”38 Their alleged 
benefit is that they “provide farmers with a broader variety of 
options for effective weed control.”39 The other common type of GE 
crops are insect-resistant crops, defined by the USDA as those 
crops “containing the gene from the soil bacterium Bt (Bacillus 
thuringiensis),” which “produce a protein that is toxic to specific 
insects, protecting the plant over its entire life.”40 
Projected spread for GE Crop Cultivation in the US is usually 
measured by acreages planted with these crops.41 So-called 
“stacked” varieties of cotton and corn, which have both HT and Bt 
traits, have accelerated in recent years, with stacked corn 
accounting for up 76 percent of corn acres in 2016.42 According to 
the USDA-ERS, “GE soybean adoption rates reached 94 percent in 
2016 (soybeans have only HT varieties). Adoption of all GE corn 
accounted for 92 percent of corn acreage in 2016.”43 A European 
multi-disciplinary investigation of the possible negative effects on 
the biodiversity of non-target insects in and around fields of Bt 
crops that have fuelled growing public and political concerns, found 
that pollinator, predator, and other arthropod biodiversity were 
affected.44   
 
36. See generally Czarnezki & Montgomery, supra note 18. 
37. Recent Trends in GE Adoption, supra note 7. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. The spread of GE crops is rising. See infra Figure 1. 
42. Id. 
43. Id.  
44. Effects and Mechanisms of Bt Transgenes on Biodiversity of Non-Target 
Insects: Pollinators, Herbivores and Their Natural Enemies, in A DECADE OF EU-
FUNDED GMO RESEARCH (2001-2010), supra note 1, at 52. 
11
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Figure 1: Adoption of GE crops in the US.45 
 
The USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) reports that “HT 
soybeans went from 17 percent of U.S. soybean acreage in 1997 
to . . . 94 percent in 2014, 2015, and 2016. Plantings of HT cotton 
expanded from about 10 percent of U.S. acreage in 1997 to . . . 89 
percent in 2015 and 2016.”46 Moreover, “[p]lantings of Bt corn grew 
from about 8 percent of U.S. corn acreage in 1997 to . . . 79 percent 
in 2016. . . . Plantings of Bt cotton also expanded rapidly, from 15 
percent of U.S. cotton acreage in 1997 to . . . 84 percent in 2014, 
2015, and 2016.”47 
 
45. Figure reprinted from Recent Trends in GE Adoption, supra note 7. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2
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B. Risks of GMO Under-Regulation of GMOs 
Under-Regulation of GMOs, favoring the alleged free-trade 
view, prioritizes profitability of agriculture over other important 
considerations, such as public health, socio-economic, and direct 
and indirect environmental effects. In fact, a 2015 review study 
published in Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment examined 
“the direct and indirect trait-specific effects of GM plants, 
microbes, and animals on ecosystem processes” and concluded 
“that most of the effects of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
on ecosystem processes are indirect and are the result of associated 
changes in management strategy rather than a direct effect of the 
GMOs.”48 The researchers from the Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences explain that “manipulated traits may 
introduce unforeseen effects on ecological processes, and there is a 
possibility of trade-offs at the genetic, physiological or ecological 
level that constrain the opportunities for improving resource-use 
management using modern biotechnology.”49 They also found that 
“the adoption of novel transgenic plants, animals, and microbes in 
agricultural systems globally may have potentially large impacts 
at [the] ecosystem level.”50 Those impacts mainly affect net 
production, nutrient cycling, greenhouse gas fluxes, biodiversity, 
and crop-weed and trophic interactions.51 Thus, “knowledge of 
their sustainable use and environmental impact is crucial,” but for 
HT and Bt crops, the most studied GM crops’ “direct effects of GM 
traits are rare and effects on ecosystem processes have seldom 
been documented.”52 
Most of the effects of GMOs on ecosystem processes that have 
been reported to date are indirect, appearing to rely on complex, 
multi-trophic interactions, and are primarily a consequence of 
changes in agricultural practices associated with, for example, the 
 
48. Anna-Karin Kolseth et al., Influence of Genetically Modified Organisms 
on Agro-Ecosystem Processes, 214 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 96, 96 (2015), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281559358_Influence_of_genetically_
modified_organisms_on_agro-ecosystem_processes [https://perma.cc/GJ6M-UN 
93]. 
49. Id. at 97 (citation omitted). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 102.  
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use of HT and insect-resistant crops.53 The Swedish researchers 
identified knowledge gaps and highlighted the “urgent need for 
basic ecological and agronomic research on the impacts of traits 
(modified with conventional methods or GM) on ecosystem 
processes in order to evaluate the possible effects of GMOs in an 
appropriate setting.”54 Precisely this knowledge gap lies between 
the European precautionary and the US-American biotechnology 
approaches in regulating GE crops. In short, the US evaluates 
risks from GMOs as products and asks “what is made?” while the 
EU’s approval process of GMOs is process-oriented, asking “how is 
it made?” The resulting dissonance is at the heart of the solution 
proposed herein, respecting both approaches and suggesting a 
bridge to allow both to coexist. 
In the US, GMOs are regulated under the Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, which “was 
promulgated by the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy in 1986 to address the budding biotechnology industry.”55 
The Framework was designed to institute a “comprehensive 
federal regulatory policy” for GM research and products, and 
specified that GM products would be regulated under then-existing 
laws and regulations instead of developing new laws to address the 
new technology.56 The basis for this policy was the government’s 
conclusion that GM products are not fundamentally different from 
non-GM products or inherently risky, and thus the final product of 
 
53. It should also be noted that, 
many of the published reports on the effects of GMOs are descriptive 
and lack functional-mechanistic analyses aiming at the causal rela-
tionships between organismal traits and relevant ecosystem processes 
in agro-ecosystems or of importance for natural resource manage-
ment. The focus of most investigations is on risk assessment at species 
level without considering an ecosystem perspective. There are also nu-
merous conflicting results on the performance and environmental ef-
fects of GM crops, especially with regard to effects on crop yield and 
impacts on non-target organisms. It has previously been pointed out 
that this type of data is inconclusive or contradictory and that any 
discussion on the potential of GM crops needs to take these complex 
results into account. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
54. Id. at 102. 
55. Czarnezki & Montgomery, supra note 18, at 99. 
56. Id. 
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biotechnology should be regulated, rather than the process of 
creating GM products.57 
The three agencies responsible for GMO regulation under the 
Framework are the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA).58 In short, the FDA oversees what is safe 
to eat, the USDA oversees what is safe to grow, and the EPA 
oversees what is safe for the environment. Notably, the USDA has 
primary authority over all GE plants “except those that are pest-
protected” and “oversees the interstate movement, import, field 
testing . . . and generally ensures that they are safe to grow.”59 
USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), 
under the authority of the Plant Protection Act (PPA), mandates 
that USDA’s APHIS oversights prevents the release and spread of 
“plant pests,” broadly defined as organisms “that can injure or 
cause disease or damage (directly or indirectly) in or to any plants 
or plant parts,”60 commonly known as “weeds.” None of the 
agencies directly address questions of food issues with climate 
change, nor do they help streamline and decentralize the system 
as a whole. 
Environmental scholars have repeatedly lamented that, “as 
a result of the policy set out in the Framework, no single law 
directly addresses GM plants or GM products in general. Instead, 
as many as 12 statutes, a myriad of regulations, and five different 
agencies and services play a role in governing GM products.”61 All 
of the regulatory oversight in the cracks and crevices left behind 
an ever-stronger Biotech and BigAg lobby yields several risks that 
remain unaccounted for from the regulatory and legal point of 
view. Environmental risks from GE crops include the possibility 
that GM plants or traits give rise to superweeds resistant to 
herbicides, that insects become resistant to Bt crops or pesticides 
used in synchrony with GM crops, reduced biodiversity, the effects 
of GM crops and the associated chemicals on non-target 
organisms,62 i.e other wildlife and plants, monoculture cultivation 
 
57. Czarnezki & Montgomery, supra note 18.  
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 99-100. 
60. Id. at 100 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2012)). 
61. Id. at 99. 
62. Id. at 97.  
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and the land use, soil depletion, freshwater waste for irrigation, 
and fossil-fuel-dependent intensive agriculture associated with 
GM cropping. The cumulative effects of these policies lack in 
convergence. 
C. Free Trade Versus Protectionism 
This paper seeks to examine the nuances between the two 
opposing views of free trade versus protectionism in international 
food trade,63 specifically focusing on the problem of GMO 
regulation, where BigAg has benefitted from the tension of these 
competing regulatory views and consolidated food systems. On the 
one hand, as Professor Michael Roberts from UCLA Law School 
explains, the free trade view expects that “the expansion of food 
trade is good for consumers, farmers, and the United States as a 
whole,” and “that consumers have come to expect the world food 
system to provide them with a wide choice of products and that 
changes in consumer taste have encouraged the emergence of 
global markets and added to the significance of trade.”64 Moreover, 
subscribers to the free trade view “posit[] that trade enables 
farmers to build markets for surplus food and has helped maintain 
in the United States a competitive domestic food market” and base 
their opinion “on a market model in which food trade between the 
United States and other countries flows without restrictions 
imposed by government.”65 
The expansion of GMOs and the underlying trade have, 
however, undermined this view in creating trade distortions, 
which, in turn “create more universal problems, such as food 
insecurity, social unrest, unsustainable food production, 
environmentally harmful farming, and political uncertainty.”66 As 
a result of distorted trade of GE crops, specifically of commodity 
crops, global food distribution has become ineffective.67 Through 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), which are “deep integration 
 
63. See MICHAEL ROBERTS, FOOD LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 57 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2016). 
64. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
65. Id. 
66. Steier, supra note 23, at 1. 
67. YING CHEN, TRADE, FOOD SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE RULES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND THE EVOLVING WORLD 
FOOD CRISIS 73 (Routledge 2014). 
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partnerships between countries or regions with a major share of 
world trade and foreign direct investments,”68 highly-productive 
nations, such as the US, “often fail to address the inequalities of 
trading partners and miss the important goal of trading 
governments to ensure food security.”69 As such, the ever-
expanding BigAg network spans not only agriculture and trade, 
but also policy and socio-economic aspects of many nations. 
On the other side of the spectrum, competing with the liberal 
free trade is the notion that uncontrolled “expansion of food trade 
threatens food safety, food security, farms and food enterprises, the 
environment, and culture” because unrestricted “food trade 
encapsulates the inequity between the industrialized nations and 
the poorer, predominantly rural countries.”70 This protectionist 
vision for food trade envisions a fair distribution of importing and 
exporting countries and crops, rather than a centralized and lop-
sided BigAg-dominated grid where the haves and haves not, as 
Ernest Hemingway once put it,71 compete in one global market to 
the detriment of the latter. Consequently, while “[t]hose who 
oppose trade liberalization of food favor restrictions to trade,”72 as 
Professor Roberts explains, the problem is more nuanced, as 
illustrated by the GMO-focus of this paper. Stepping back and 
simplifying the tension to a mere clash to free trade versus 
protectionism is an oversimplification prone to misinterpretation 
and lobbyist abuse in favor of either end of the spectrum. With the 
BigAg lobby pouring $94,282,881 in 2016 alone73 to control the 
discourse and policy, one must steer clear of these pitfalls and 
traps from logical fallacies so often abused by the industry.74 
Instead of the mere clash between the free trade and protectionist, 
 
68. Call for Papers: 2016 AgLaw Colloquium, INST. LAW, POLI. & DEV. (Oct. 
20, 2016), http://www.santannapisa.it/it/event/2016-aglaw-colloquium [https://pe 
rma.cc/45WL-R4FT],  
69. Steier, supra note 23, at 2. 
70. ROBERTS, supra note 63, at 57. 
71. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, TO HAVE AND HAVE NOT (1937). 
72. Id. 
73. Sector Profile, 2016: Annual Lobbying for Agribusiness, OPENSECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=A [https://perma.cc/JX7V-T4 
S9]. 
74. THE GMO DECEPTION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE FOOD, 
CORPORATIONS, AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PUTTING OUR FAMILIES AND OUR 
ENVIRONMENT AT RISK (Sheldon Krimsky & Jeremy Gruber eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter THE GMO DECEPTION]. 
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the actual subject matter of trade must therefore be considered 
alongside the public health, socio-economic, and environmental 
effects to ensure a well-rounded analysis. 
D. GMO Regulation in the EU 
By comparison to the US, European GMO regulation is largely 
streamlined and follows the aforementioned precautionary 
principle through EU Directives on point. “In 1990, the European 
Council adopted Directive 90/220/EEC on the Deliberate Release 
of Genetically Modified Organisms,” taking “a process rather than 
product-oriented approach”75 like the US Framework. Notably, the 
Directive’s language is in stark contrast to the US Framework, 
where the Directive notes that it is “based on the principle that 
preventive action should be taken . . . whereas the effects of such 
releases on the environment may be irreversible” and where “the 
protection of human health and the environment requires that due 
attention be given to controlling risks from the deliberate release 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment.”76 
Notably, its preamble already establishes that “case-by-case 
environmental risk assessment should always be carried out prior 
to a release,”77 taking the “better safe than sorry” approach as 
opposed to the US counterpart’s “safe until proven unsafe” dogma. 
Other Directives on point are Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on 
genetically modified food and feed78 and Implementing Regulation 
503/2013 on applications for authorisation of genetically modified 
food and feed.79 Both of these regulations give the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) authority over GMOs and set forth a 
rigorous safety assessment, including the procedures for 
evaluation and authorisation of GM foods and feeds,80 which are 
largely banned and barely cultivated in the EU. 
In June 2015, EFSA published a new guidance clarifying the 
data needs for the agronomic and phenotypic characterisation of 
 
75. Id. 
76. Council Directive 1990/220, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15 (EC). 
77. Id. 
78. Commission Regulation 1829/03, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1 (EU). 
79. Commission Regulation 503/13, 2013 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EU). 
80. Genetically Modified Organisms, EUR. FOOD SAFETY AUTH., https:// 
www.efsa.europa.eu/en/topics/topic/gmo [https://perma.cc/FUM4-V6GW]. 
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GM plants.81 The document complements existing guidance on 
data requirements for the risk assessment of GM plants. “It gives 
applicants seeking market approval for a GM plant in the 
European Union recommendations on how to generate, analyse 
and interpret agronomic and phenotypic data of the GM plant.”82 
Interestingly, the 2015 “guidance proposes a comprehensive and 
harmonised approach for the agronomic and phenotypic 
characterisation of GM plants, which should ensure the best use of 
agronomic and phenotypic data for the comparative analysis of GM 
plants and derived food and feed products, and for their food and 
feed and environmental risk assessment.”83 This guidance alone 
illustrates that EFSA acknowledges and is aware of the risks that 
GMOs pose, leading to a near zero-tolerance of GMOs in the 
European market – a stark contrast to the US approach. 
Putting all of this into context, the EU essentially up-regulates 
GMOs while the US down-regulates GMOs. This divergence is in 
part due to agricultural exceptionalism in the US and can only be 
overcome if agriculture is positioned within environmental law and 
the climate change discussion about resilient food production and 
food integrity. The reason why the US has historically down- and 
under-regulated GMOs is a function of its agricultural 
exceptionalism, the very policy allowing special status for food 
producers. 
E. Agricultural Exceptionalism and GMO Down-
Regulation in the US 
Agricultural exceptionalism is the point at which food and 
agriculture law diverge. Agricultural law,84 rooted in Jeffersonian 
elitism, has been distorted into a system reminiscent of nepotism 
from long passed feudal and colonial regimes, based on the societal 
 
81. EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, Guidance on the 
Agronomic and Phenotypic Characterisation of Genetically Modified Plants, 
13 EFSA J. 44 (2015). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. “Agricultural law can be defined as the study of the network of laws and 
policies that apply to the production, marketing, and sale of agricultural products, 
i.e., the food we eat, the natural fibers we wear, and increasingly, the bio-fuels 
that run our vehicles.” Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural 
Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935 (2010). 
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goal to preserve and protect farms. It is the basis for the 
conglomerates of multi-national companies—BigAg—which shape 
the multi-lateral food trade, thereby controlling large aspects of 
agriculture world-wide. As Professor Roberts explains, “examples 
of agricultural exceptionalism via the law include protections 
afforded to farmers in labor, bankruptcy, and international trade; 
exceptions to environmental and antitrust regulations; and 
programs based on subsidies, loans, and education.”85 Scholars 
have called for a “reconsideration of agricultural law and policy to 
address the unique aspects of agricultural production, the fragility 
of the environment, and the fundamental need for healthy food,”86 
but the legislature has not responded to satisfy the demands of food 
lawyers. Distinguishable from agriculture law, food law is 
practiced by those learned colleagues exploring the intersection of 
law and food, in terms of how food sustains life, affects the quality 
of life, shapes societies, and manifests cultural values.87 Food 
lawyers hold the law accountable for the five topics it covers, 
commerce, safety, marketing, nutrition, and systems,88 all of which 
are complex and connected. Thus, while agricultural law largely 
represents farms and agricultural enterprises, food law concerns 
itself with the safe and sustainable production of food in a manner 
that ensures the highest possible quality of life in a more holistic 
approach, considering food security, food sovereignty, biodiversity, 
and ecologic systems at large. The point of divergence and friction 
between agricultural law and food law is simply the premise that 
exceptionalism should not be a permissible lair of BigAg’s 
externalized costs.89 
Domestic GMO policy has taken a pro-industry approach, 
down-regulating the agricultural sector to benefit BigAg’s cost 
externalization practices. As asserted by the FAO and other 
organizations: 
agricultural biotechnology will be important to meet global 
nutritional needs in 2050. Many countries have responded to this 
challenge, allowing agricultural biotechnology innovations to be 
 
85. ROBERTS, supra note 63, at 6-7. 
86. Schneider, supra note 84, at 935. 
87. ROBERTS, supra note 63, at 2. 
88. Id. 
89. See Gabriela Steier, Externalities in Industrial Food Production: The 
Costs of Profit, 9(3) DARTMOUTH L.J. 163 (2011). 
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commercialized as part of their strategic response to the FAO 
challenge. While Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and the 
USA have all approved the production of GM crops, few developing 
countries have followed suit.90 
Even peer-reviewed scientific journals fall prey to the 
misunderstandings about GMO safety, criticizing the EU for its 
progressive, precautionary, and effective approach to ban GMOs.91 
However, even Europe’s ban is not absolute. In fact, Monsanto’s 
Maize MON 810 is the only GE crop that has been approved in the 
EU.92 Between its approval in 1998 and the expiration of the 
license in 2013, 150,000 hectares have been planted with MON 
810, with 91.3 percent in Spain alone.93 The European Parliament 
News reported that GMOs are banned in Germany, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Greece and Italy, and 
predicts that “it is possible that other countries could follow 
suit.”94 
The debate over GMOs on a governance level continues. In 
fact, “the European Commission is proposing to give member 
states the power to ban the commercialisation of GMOs on their 
territory, even if they have already been approved at EU level.”95 
However, members of the European parliament rejected the 
proposal for “fear it could prove unworkable and lead to border 
controls between countries that disagree on GMOs, which would 
affect the internal market.”96 The EU imports most of its GE 
soybeans from the US, Brazil, and Argentina but products 
containing more than 0.09 percent of GMOs must be labeled in the 
EU,97 thereby shifting the risk assessment partially to consumers. 
Thus, the debate over GMOs centers around the utility versus the 
need, on the one hand, and the possible risks and reserves, on the 
 
90. Stuart J. Smyth et al., EU Failing FAO Challenge to Improve Global 
Food Security, 34 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 521, 521 (2016). 
91. See generally THE GMO DECEPTION, supra note 74. 
92. Eight Things you Should know About GMOs, EUR. PARLIAMENT NEWS 
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20151013ST 
O97392/eight-things-you-should-know-about-gmos [https://perma.cc/KK4S-QY 
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94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
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other hand.98 As long as the proliferation of GMOs continues to be 
trivialized by their mass production, BigAg’s business remains 
guarded under agricultural exceptionalism. 
From a European perspective, agricultural exceptionalism 
resembles an artificial construct: 
[o]ver the years, the boundary between the species is broken and 
new varieties are introduced, for example, a gene of the pig in a 
tomato, a firefly gene into a tobacco plant and a human gene into 
a bull. The killing of the natural boundaries between species, the 
unpredictability of long-term effects and irreversibility of the po-
tential environmental consequences are among the main risks as-
sociated with GMO[s].99 
Notably, in a telling and suspicious lack of studies on point, 
“the review articles published in international scientific journals 
during the current decade did not find . . . references concerning 
human and animal toxicological/health risks studies on GM 
foods.”100 “It is therefore important that the legislation on GMOs 
in the EU and its Member States, in many third countries and in 
international treaties be based on this reality.”101 
III. THE SOLUTION 
A. Cap-and-Trade in Climate Change Policy and GE 
Commodity Crops 
If commodity crops, specifically the most commonly traded 
GMOs, were regulated under a cap-and-trade scheme borrowed 
from climate change regulation, a system shift toward improved 
food integrity might result. In a cap-and-trade regulatory model, a 
government sets a limit on the quantity of GHG emissions, 
distributes permits for allowable emissions that add up to the cap, 
and enables firms to buy and sell the permits after the initial 
distribution.102 Regulated sources must pay allowances at the end 
 
98. Margherita Arcieri, Spread and Potential Risks of Genetically Modified 
Organisms, 8 AGRIC. & AGRIC. SCI. PROCEDIA 552, 554 (2016). 
99. Id.  
100. Id. (citation omitted). 
101. Id. 
102. HARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND 
POLICY 34-35 (2012). 
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of a given period equal to their emissions,103 but ultimately strive 
to stay within the cap. The price for emission allowances (the 
carbon price) is determined by supply and demand for allowances 
in an emissions trading market.104 
Applied to GE crop trades, governments concerned with the 
environmental and food safety risks of GMOs could cap the 
quantities of crops that may be distributed, creating an 
environment similar to the GHG trading model under the Paris 
Agreement. Briefly, under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), GHG emissions are 
traded like commodities105 – hence the parallel to the GMO trading 
proposal. Here, the regulated sources would be easily traceable 
food conglomerates, such as the major GE seed producing 
companies and BigAg’s main players. At the end of a given period, 
GMO producers and sellers would essentially have to stay below a 
certain maximum amount of GMOs that may be traded, thereby 
either keeping GMOs for domestic use or reducing production 
overall. The advantage of keeping the GMOs for domestic use puts 
the brunt of the cap-and-trade scheme on the major producing 
countries: US, Brazil, and Argentina.106 As a consequence of the 
reduced export, price volatility may directly or indirectly enable 
the second benefit of this scheme, reducing GMO production 
overall, thereby forcing farmers to diversify their crops. Supply and 
demand for GMOs would thus dwindle and potentially make room 
for crop diversification and more sustainable alternatives of 
agriculture. The commodity crop trading market would 
consequently become more varied and create opportunities for 
agro-ecologic farming to push BigAg’s market dominance aside, 
thereby decentralizing the market further. 
Refining the commodity-crop cap-and trade scheme further, 
the upstream alternative, as opposed to the downstream version, 
lends itself to this scenario. Again, borrowing from climate change 
policy, 
 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. International Emissions Trading, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trad 
ing/items/2731.php [https://perma.cc/3BFR-BBED]. 
106. Countries Growing GMOs, GMO COMPASS (Jan. 19, 2007), http://www. 
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an upstream cap-and-trade (UCT) system applies to fuel suppli-
ers and requires them to surrender allowances equivalent to the 
carbon content of fossil fuels they distribute. . . . This option has 
the advantage of being relatively simple, and it covers the entire 
economy. Analyses have shown that it would be environmentally 
efficient, minimize economic costs to the economy, be manageable 
administratively, and link easily to domestic and international off-
set programs.107 
Here, the commodity crop UCT would apply to GE crop 
producers and their supply chains, including pesticide, herbicide, 
and chemical fertilizer producers, down to the distributors of fossil-
fuel dependent machinery upon which industrial agriculture 
relies, covering the entire economy. Food lawyers might argue that 
more environmentally friendly alternatives would ensue if the 
BigAg system were weakened through such a UCT. 
B. An Upstream Cap-and-Trade (UCT) Model for GE 
Commodity Crops 
The premise of the UCT model lies in its simplicity. As long as 
the goal is to create market forces that those countries following 
the precautionary approach, such as the EU, need is to shift food 
systems away from industrial agriculture and toward agroecology, 
thereby diversifying the commodity crop market by creating 
opportunities to compete with non-GMO crops, the UCT model is a 
powerful tool to create opportunities for improvement. Juxtaposing 
the business-as-usual model (Figure 2) with the market 
mechanisms and feedback loops of the UCT model (Figure 3) 
highlights how powerful the simple limitations of the cap are. 
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Figure 2: Business as Usual Scenario 
 
The business as usual graph illustrates factors contributing to the 
centralization of the food system and its relationship to trade in GE 
commodity crops. From left to right, GMO producers (BigAg) use 
substantial resources, which appear in boxes on the far left. These inputs 
include pesticides, herbicides and chemical fertilizers, machinery and 
fossil fuels, natural resources, labor, land acreage and others. As noted 
above, the production of GE commodity crops is inextricably intertwined 
with the industrial agriculture and monocultures, thereby depleting 
resources and causing environmental harm (see curved arrows in the 
center). Other side effects of GMO production and processing are 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), which are considered pollution and 
further environmentally harmful practices. For the reason that the 
business and usual model illustrates the centralized food system, it also 
shows the food safety and food security risks, thereby impairing food 
integrity. Together, the side effects shows through the curved arrows are 
externalized costs, creating socioeconomic burdens that are borne by the 
public and aggravated through the environmental harm. Overall, this is 
how GMO producers can create a profit margin and export commodity 
crops (see the long horizontal arrow), and dump surplus on importing 
countries. Notable here is the lack of defenses of importing countries. 
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Figure 3: GE Commodity Crop Upstream Cap-and-Trade 
Model 
 
This is a snapshot illustrating the effects of the upstream cap-and-trade 
model once the caps, maximum allowances under the caps, have been 
reached and the positive effects of the limitation accrue. When the curved 
grey arrow representing GE commodity crop trade hits the cap (shown as 
a black crescent line in the center), a shift in side effects and trade im-
pacts occurs. In this upstream cap-and-trade model, GMO producers are 
forced to internalize the costs of production, thereby accounting for all the 
inputs (boxed terms in the far left). Consequently, the GMO producers 
have control to mitigate the risks (curved arrows), such as food safety and 
food security, GHG emissions, resource depletion, and environmental 
degradation. For the reason that there is only output (long black arrow in 
the center) if the GMO producers internalize the costs of production, there 
is diminished and controlled GMO export and trade. A balance of profit 
and internalization of risk ensues, lifting the socioeconomic burden on the 
importing countries. The diminished and controlled GMO export and 
trade creates a window of opportunity to use domestic resources because 
these importing parties are less reliant on imports, thereby encouraging 
domestic crop diversification. Notable here is the presence of defenses 
(crescent line in the center) of importing countries and the beneficial side 
effects (illustrated through light grey looping arrows in the far right. 
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C. Evaluating a GMO Regulatory Model Borrowed from 
Climate Change Policy 
Escalating food law beyond solely food safety issues quickly 
delves deeply into the realm of environmental sustainability and, 
inherently to the environmental discourse, into questions of cli-
mate change contributions of the food and agriculture sector. Food 
production in the US alone accounts for 20% of overall fossil fuel 
consumption,108 where it takes 30.3 liters of gas to till one hectare 
of land today with a 50 horsepower tractor, fossil fuel inputs that 
are directly linked to the carbon emissions going into the atmos-
phere.109 Industrial agriculture and GMO cultivation in monocul-
tures contributes to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—and 
thereby to global temperature rises110—as demonstrated by high 
certainty evidence corroborated by the United Nation’s panels of 
experts—the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC)—who published these findings in their most recent reports. 
Specifically, the IPCC found that the agricultural “sector is respon-
sible for just under a quarter (~10–12 GtCO2eq/year) of anthropo-
genic GHG emissions, mainly from deforestation and agricultural 
emissions from livestock, soil and nutrient management,”111 fac-
tors overlapping with the inputs highlighted in Figures 2 and 3. 
Tackling the agricultural sector, however, is particularly promis-
ing because, as the IPCC concluded, “the mitigation potential is 
derived from both an enhancement of removals of greenhouse 
gases (GHG), as well as reduction of emissions through manage-
ment of land and livestock.”112 It follows that the links between 
food production and climate change already exist and that the sub-
ject lends itself to comparison to find solution to shared environ-
mental concerns. 
The major benefit of the cap-and-trade model is the decentral-
ization of the food system, which would have a positive ripple effect 
 
108. Jason J. Czarnezki & Elisa K. Prescott, Environmental and Climate 
Impacts of Food Production, Processing, Packaging, and Distribution, in FOOD, 
AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 18, at 115. 
109. Id. at 117. 
110. Id. 
111. Pete Smith et al., Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 816 (2014). 
112. Id. 
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on the agricultural sector, allowing agroecology to surge and miti-
gate some effects of climate change. Under the proposed model, 
BigAg would only be able to grow and continue to export its prod-
ucts if they diversified their crops, away from the four major 
GMOs: corn, wheat, soy, and rice. As such, to stay competitive in 
the free market economy,113 BigAg would, in theory, shift its focus 
to other types of crops. A logical consequence of this development 
would be that BigAg might genetically engineer and patent other 
types of crops, eventually expanding the centralized food system to 
more than the four major commodity crops. The problem of the cen-
tralized food system would not directly be solved. Nonetheless, in-
directly decentralizing food systems by capping GMOs would de-
stabilize the trade paths for a certain period, providing the moment 
that many existing producers of other crops might need. Thus, 
gearing up to enter international markets and interrupting exist-
ing import and export patterns would create opportunities for non-
BigAg producers to seize parts of the food system, thereby decen-
tralizing the system. It is the window of opportunity114 for the un-
derdogs of the food system to take the long shots of entering a mar-
ket that is otherwise dominated by BigAg and seemingly 
impermeable. Through the UCT implementation, an otherwise un-
attainable opportunity is created that, if used mindfully, forces 
BigAg to internalize the cost of production along with the associ-
ated risks of GMO production, giving others the chance to enter 
the market and compete with other crops. 
Other benefits include policy incentives, where legislators 
would be empowered to advocate for the underdogs, stripping some 
lobbying power away from BigAg as soon as the caps are reached. 
Environmental organizations and concerned members of the public 
might applaud proactive and well-targeted caps that strengthen 
 
113. See generally Chris Seabury, Free Markets: What’s The Cost?, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/free-market-
regulation.asp?ad=dirN&qo=serpSearchTopBox&qsrc=1&o=40186&lgl=bnull-
baseline-below-content [https://perma.cc/SSQ5-MUZZ] (outlining positives and 
negatives of free market economy system). 
114. A window of opportunity is defined as “a short time period during which 
an otherwise unattainable opportunity exists. After the window of opportunity 
closes, the opportunity ceases to exist.” Window of Opportunity, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/window-of-opportunity.asp#ixzz4VLwSWe 
Dj [https://perma.cc/96Y6-TQ5P].  
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/2
 2017] GMO REGULATION THROUGH CAP-AND-TRADE 321 
local economies and force producers to internalize the costs of pro-
duction rather than externalizing them to the public at large, as 
depicted in Figure 3. 
In practice, any UCT implementation should be incremental, 
for only staggered momenta can accumulate to the positive effects 
proposed in this model. Simply put, policy makers should create 
several caps occurring over an extended period of time, repeating 
the snapshot illustrated in Figure 3, with the goal to tap the UCT 
benefits over and over and for various crops. Although the predic-
tions in this paper are speculative and far from all encompassing, 
the ideas presented will hopefully nudge policy makers in the right 
direction. In fact, the results might play out in various scenarios, 
the most beneficial of which would result in weakened margins for 
the most commonly and widely traded GE commodity crops, bring-
ing the reliance of the industrialized agriculture and GMO mono-
cultures to stagnation. Eventually, resource depletion and environ-
mental degradation could be slowed, creating yet another window 
of opportunity for agroecology115 to assume a large role in interna-
tional food production. In other words, enacting caps and repeating 
the UCT process visualized in Figure 3 facilitates food integrity 
improvements on a large scale, relying on agroecology. 
Resuming the comparative analysis of the UCT model, taking 
a precautionary approach has, indeed, risk-aversion potential. For 
instance, in food systems, the US is taking the biotech principle, 
which permits food to be marketed until it is proven unsafe.116 In 
the EU, however, the precautionary approach only allows foods to 
be marketed that have been proven safe,117 as noted above. This 
illustrates two ends of a spectrum, with a gap between them, where 
 
115. For the purpose of this paper, agroecology is defined as the symbiotic 
relationship of agriculture and ecology, a harmonious blend of practices that 
ensure sustainable, environmentally friendly, safe and transparent food 
production. Agroecology shall be understood to be the opposite of industrial, 
resource-intensive agriculture and monoculture. This is the author’s own 
definition of agroecology, a definition which she is further developing in her 
upcoming book AGROBIODIVERSITY AND AGROECOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESILIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL FOOD LAW. 
116. Biotechnology Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,  
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=AGRICULTURE&conte
ntid=BiotechnologyFAQs.xml [https://perma.cc/2MXM-7NNQ]. 
117. See generally Food Law General Principles, EUR. COMM’N,  http://ec.euro 
pa.eu/food/safety/general_food_law/principles/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/G4 
TE-BPHT]. 
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certain potentially unsafe foods are marketed in the US, but not in 
the EU. Although this comparison is highly simplified, it shows 
how national and regional policy approaches can affect a whole sys-
tem. For instance, those potentially unsafe foods that are not per-
mitted in the EU may, nonetheless, be imported from the US and, 
thereby, enter the European market, making it difficult for Euro-
pean legislators and policy makers to prevent this cross-contami-
nation.118 
The same cross-contamination can happen in climate policy 
when different nations take incompatible approaches to regulating 
factors that contribute to climate change, offsetting each other’s 
efforts. However, the efforts to mitigate, combat and adapt to cli-
mate change must be priorities in policy approaches around the 
world and taking a precautionary approach may aid to use the 
available data are more serious warning signs. According to the 
European Commission, the precautionary principle established 
common guidelines and “enables rapid response in the face of a 
possible danger to human, animal or plant health, or to protect the 
environment.”119 Thus, this precautionary approach may require 
that the climate change risks with medium and high levels of sci-
entific certainty become guideposts for policy makers – until and 
unless any risks to further aggravate climate change can be con-
clusively discounted (if ever).120 
IV. CONCLUSION 
An upstream regulation of GE commodity crops might decen-
tralize food systems, thereby opening trade up for other crops. The 
benefits reach along the supply and distribution chains, eventually 
favoring agroecology approaches over industrial agriculture and 
monocultures. The UCT model, however, is limited in that it rep-
resents a snapshot momentum that creates a window of oppor-
tunity for agroecology to compete with BigAg’s food trade domi-
nance. If this window of opportunity is not seized, BigAg will 
simply diversify its supply and thereby control the demand in the 
 
118. The ideas in this paragraph were sparked by assignments in Professor 
Tracy Bach’s Climate Change Policy course at Vermont Law School (Spring 2016). 
119. The Precautionary Principle, EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al32042 [https://perma.cc/VMA4-N346] (last 
updated Nov. 30, 2016). 
120. See Food Law General Principles, supra note 117. 
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free market tradition. From the European perspective, the caps on 
GE commodity crops may validate the precautionary protectionism 
and relieve some of the pressures posed by the US-dominated free 
trade and biotechnology dogma. Overall, incremental caps could 
turn into powerful tools to restore and conserve food integrity. 
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